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I. Introduction
As our commercial, social and political worlds have been shrink-
ing, it follows that our legal world has been shrinking as well. Inter-
national commercial, social, and political contacts spawn transna-
tional litigation of kinds and quantities unknown in several decades
past. This increase in litigation presents more and different problems
than our alleged home grown domestic litigation explosion. We regu-
larly participate with litigants from different procedural systems and
philosophies. This is particularly apparent when a United States
(U.S.) litigant seeks discovery abroad or from a foreign litigant in
the U.S. These procedural and philosophical differences create an
"apples and oranges" problem. The apples of the U.S. discovery pro-
cedures are on a decidedly different tree than the oranges of Euro-
pean litigation systems.
It was presumably to resolve the apple/orange difficulty and to
establish some common ground that the Hague Evidence Convention
on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters1
[hereinafter Hague Evidence Convention or Convention] was
drafted. In 1972, the United States acceded to the Hague Evidence
Convention. Since then, there has been wide disagreement amongst
both courts and commentators as to the scope of the Convention and
its applicability to discovery requests in proceedings in U.S. courts.
* Professor, Dickinson School of Law; LL.D (Hon.), 1987, Dickinson School of Law;
LL.M, 1973, George Washington University; J.D., 1955 Univ. of Michigan; B.A., 1952, Yale
University.
** J.D.,1988, Dickinson School of Law; M.A., 1985, Brown University; B.A., 1981,
Franklin & Marshall College.
1. 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444, opened for signature, Mar. 18, 1970, reprinted in
28 U.S.C. § 1781 et seq. (1988 Supp.). After enumerating the Articles, the statute lists the
states which are parties to the Convention, along with the various notifications, extensions,
declarations, and reservations of the States. Also appended in the statutory reproduction is a
Model for Letters of Request.
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Concepts of judicial and national sovereignty dies with difficulty.
U.S. courts particularly, have heard and have taken several different
approaches in an effort (perhaps) to preserve what the court and
U.S. parties perceive to be sacred privileges or even rights under our
own Rules.
Several different interpretations of the Convention have been
adopted by the courts, and perhaps some other unarticulated pos-
sibilities exist. Thus, there are, at least, six possible approaches to
utilization of Convention procedures. One approach, advocated by
avowed internationalists, mandates exclusive resort to Convention
procedures. The Convention is a treaty and these internationalists
aver that treaties are the supreme law of the land. The second ap-
proach merely requires a first resort to the Convention processes
which then may be ignored if necessary discovery is thwarted. The
third and fourth interpretations hold, respectively, that the Conven-
tion is intended to apply only to non-U.S. discovery and that the
Convention is applicable only to discovery from non-parties. The
fifth available option asserts that the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure (Federal Rules) or state discovery rules are generally applica-
ble, but that comity principles must be examined to determine
whether an attempt should first be made to apply Convention proce-
dures. The sixth approach dictates that our own discovery rules reign
supreme and the Convention only provides an interesting option.
In 1987, the Supreme Court of the United States moved to re-
solve the interpretation question. The court considered whether sanc-
tions can properly be imposed, under our Federal Rules, upon a for-
eign litigant from whom discovery was sought without utilizing
procedures outlined in the Convention. This was the issue in
Aerospatiale.2
II. What Is This Convention?
Before discussing the options which were available to the Court
in determining whether our local, state, or federal discovery rules are
applicable in litigation taking us beyond our own borders and to
what extent the Convention is to be employed, it must be deter-
mined, through an examination of the Convention, just what the
Convention does and what was intended.
The Hague Evidence Convention,' a result of the Eleventh Ses-
2. Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale and Societe de Construction D'Avions De
Tourism v. United States District Court For the Southern District of Iowa, - U.S.
107 S. Ct. 2542 (1987) [hereinafter Aerospatiale].
3. See 28 U.S.C. § 1781 (1988 Supp.). The Hague Evidence Convention was opened for
signature March 18, 1970 and became the law of the U.S. on October 7, 1972. Other signato-
ries to the Convention include Argentina, Barbados, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Fin-
land, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands,
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sion of the Hague Conference on Private International Law in 1968,
represents a revision of part of previous Conventions, the 1954
Hague Convention on Civil Procedure and the 1905 Hague
Convention."
The purpose of developing a new Evidence Convention was:
[i]n broad outline .... to:
(a) improve the previous system of Letters of Request;
(b) enlarge the devices for the taking of evidence by in-
creasing the powers of consuls and by introducing, on a limited
basis, the Anglo-American concept of a court-appointed
commissioner;
(c) preserve all existing more favorable and less restrictive
practices resulting from internal law or practice, or from bilat-
eral or multilateral conventions.'
The three part purpose of the Convention reflects a response to the
growing conflict between the broad discovery processes of the United
States and the more restrictive systems of other nations, particularly
the civil law countries. It attempts to strike a balance between U.S.
discovery methods and the sovereignty of other nations. The guiding
principle behind the drafting of the Convention was that "[a]ny sys-
tem of obtaining evidence or securing the performance of other judi-
cial acts internationally must be 'tolerable' in the state of execution
and must be 'utilizable' in the forum of the state of origin where the
action is pending." 6 Thus, the primary motivating factor behind the
Hague Evidence Convention was to bridge the gap behind the com-
mon law and civil law systems.
The Convention is divided into three Chapters. Chapter I ad-
dresses Letters of Request; Chapter II concerns the taking of evi-
dence by diplomatic officers, consular agents, and commissioners,
while Chapter III concludes with the general clauses of the Conven-
tion. The three Chapters composing the Convention contain 42 Arti-
cles. The Convention sets forth a comprehensive evidence-gathering
scheme, as described in the following summary, Article by Article.
A. Chapter I
Chapter I sets forth the basic requirements for the use of Let-
Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom.
4. B. RISTAU, Obtaining Evidence Abroad Under the Hague Convention On the Taking
of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters of March 17, 1970 T.I.A.S. No. 7444, 23
U.S.T. 2555, International Litigation and Arbitration: Practical Approaches and Considera-
tions, in I ABA SECTION OF LITIGATION & ABA SECTION OF INT'L L. & PRAC, 85 (1987)
[hereinafter RISTAU].
5. Id. at 86.
6. Explanatory Report on the Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or
Commercial Matters, reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 37 (1969).
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ters of Requests. Article 1 provides for the obtaining of evidence or
performance of other judicial acts, in civil or commercial matters,
between Contracting States by a Letter of Request. Although the
Article limits the scope to "civil or commercial matters," a phrase
adopted from the 1905 and 1954 Conventions,' this phrase is left
undefined by the Convention. The absence of a definition, leaving
any arising disputes to be resolved through diplomatic channels,8
presents a potential problem illustrative of the basic apples/oranges
differences existing between signatory nations. For example, a
wrongful death action, civil in nature in the U.S. or U.K., may well
be deemed to be part of the criminal prosecution of the bad actor in
some civil law countries.9 Accordingly, civil law systems do not inter-
pret "civil or commercial" as encompassing tax and administrative
matters, while Egyptian law excludes matters of personal status
(family relations matters and succession) from the term.10 Moreover,
although some States use the requesting State's determination of
"civil or commercial," the majority of Convention members believe
that the executing State's interpretation should prevail."
Article 1 requires that the evidentiary request come from a judi-
cial authority and calls for a judicial proceeding or "other judicial
act." The Article defines this term negatively providing no definition
of its scope.
Beyond defiritional loopholes the Article is stated in permissive
terms. Specifically, a judicial authority may make a request by Let-
ters of Request. Proponents of the view that the Convention provides
only optional procedures often point to this language, as opposed to
the mandatory "shall" language of the other Articles 2 and other
Hague Conventions,"3 as evidence that the Convention was not in-
tended to be mandatory and exclusive. This reliance on the use of
permissive terminology, however, is misplaced. The Convention pro-
7. Report of the United States Delegation to the Special Commission on the Operation
of the Convention of 18 March 1970 On the Taking of Evidence Abroad'in Civil or Commer-
cial Matters [hereinafter U.S. Delegation Report], 17 I.L.M. 1417, 1418 (1978).
8. Id.
9. Code of Criminal Procedure (Italy), Arts. 511-523; see also G. Glos, Comparative
Law, p. 444 (1979).
10. Report on the work of the Special Commission on the Operation of the Convention
of 18 March 1970 on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters [herein-
after Permanent Bureau Report], 17 I.L.M. 1425, 1426 (1978). See also, U.S. Delegation
Report, supra note 7, at 1418. France and Germany have indicated (through delegate and
observer) that they would be flexible when receiving foreign requests which, in their systems,
would be considered administrative. Id. at 1419.
11. Permanent Bureau Report, supra note 10, at 1426.
12. For example:
Article 2: ". . . shall designate a Central Authority ....
Article 3: "A Letter of Request shall specify .... "
Article 4: "A Letter of Request shall be in the language.
13. See, e.g., Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial
Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, 20 U.S.T. 361, T.I.A.S. No. 6638.
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vides for various methods of taking evidence; since Letters of Re-
quest are one of these methods, it is more plausible to interpret the
permissive language as permitting the use of this method as opposed
to the others set forth in the Convention. Interpreting this language
as evidence that the Convention itself provides only an option, ren-
ders the Convention superfluous and certainly does not advance the
intended aims of creating an internationally accepted discovery
process.
Article 2 deals with the establishment of the Central Author-
ity,"' to receive and transmit the Letters of Requests. Article 3 enu-
merates the required contents for a Letter of Request.15 The Special
Commission on the Operation of the Convention of 18 March 1970
On the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters
(Special Commission), at its meeting at The Hague held June 12-15,
1978, drafted a model form of the Letters." Article 4 sets forth the
language requirement for the Letters, including provisions for estab-
lishing the language to be used, the allocation of costs for noncompli-
ance with this requirement, and the requisite certification of
translations.
Article 5, 6, and 7, respectively, address the duty of the Central
Authority if it believes the Letter does not comply with the Conven-
tion, the course to be followed if the authority to whom the request
has been addressed is not competent to execute it, and the means of
serving notice upon the requesting authority of the when and where
of the proceeding so that parties and their representatives may be
present.
Presence of judicial personnel of the requesting State at the exe-
cution of the Letter is discussed in Article 8. Article 9 stipulates the
14. The Department of Justice is the named Central Authority for the United States. 28
C.F.R. § 0.49 (1983).
15. Specifically, Article 3 reads:
(a) the authority requesting its execution and the authority requested to
execute it, if known to the requesting authority;
(b) the names and addresses of the parties to the proceedings and their
representatives, if any;
(c) the nature of the proceedings for which the evidence is required, giving
all necessary information in regard thereto;
(d) the evidence to be obtained or other judicial act to be performed.
Where appropriate, the Letter shall specify, inter alia-
(e) the names and addresses of the persons to be examined;
(f) the questions to be put to the persons to be examined or a statement of
the subject-matter about which they are to be examined;
(g) the documents or other property, real or personal, to be inspected;
(h) any requirement that the evidence is to be given an oath or affirmation,
and any special form to be used;
(i) any special method or procedure to be followed under Article 9.
A Letter may also mention any information necessary for the application of
Article 11.
No legalization or other like formality may be required.
16. Model annexed to the Permanent Bureau Report, supra note 10, at 1436-1439.
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methods and procedures which the executing State must apply. This
Article also includes a provision requiring the executing State1 7 to
follow any specially requested procedures unless they are incompati-
ble with its internal law or impossible to perform. Further, Article 9
calls for "expeditious" execution of Letters. 8 The reference to the
impossibility of performance does not permit refusal based upon cus-
tom or tradition, but may arguably refer only to the situation where
a statute expressly prohibits the requested procedure.
Article 10 mandates the procedures to be employed by the exe-
cuting State, following its internal law to compel compliance with
the request. Article 11 addresses the exercise and recognition of priv-
ileges and duties to refuse to give evidence. Such privileges and du-
ties are recognized only if they are recognized in the executing State
or in the requesting State.' 9 If a privilege exists in the requesting
State, confirmed by the proper authority of the requesting State. The
Article further permits a State to recognize privileges and duties of
States other than the requesting and executing States.
Article 12 explicates grounds for refusal to execute. These
grounds are based upon a determination that execution is not a func-
tion of the judiciary in the executing State and that the sovereignty
or security of the executing State would be impinged. Article 12 also
provides grounds upon which execution may not be refused, namely,
that the executing State claims exclusive subject matter jurisdiction
or does not recognize the action in its jurisprudence. One author
notes that the provisions of Article 12 must be read in conjunction
with the further grounds for refusal covered by Article 5.20 Article
13 concerns the return of the requested documents and partially exe-
cuted requests. Finally, Article 14 discusses reimbursement of costs.
B. Chapter H
Chapter II which includes Articles 15 to 22 sets forth the re-
quirements for taking evidence by diplomatic officers, consular
17. The executing state is the state of whom the request for assistance is made, the
requested state.
18. Fortunately, the potential problem arising from an anticipated refusal to permit
cross examination, for example, which presumably may be incompatible with the internal law
of a civil law country, has not yet represented much difficulty when Convention procedures are
followed. As evidenced in Corning Glass Works v. I.T.T., No. 76-0144 (W.D. Va.) the Ger-
man court did, in fact, permit cross examination by counsel even though such a procedure was
unknown in the German system cited in C. Platto, Taking Evidence Abroad for Use in Civil
Cases in the United States - A Practical Guide, [hereinafter Platto], 16 INT'L LAW. 574
(1982). See supra Platto for a detailed discussion of discovery procedures utilized.
19. Reference is made, for example, to the extensive business secrets privilege existing
on the continent, particularly in Germany and Switzerland. See Articles 162, 273, and 321,
Swiss Penal Code of Dec. 21, 1932 Governing Business and Manufacturing Secrets, Economic
Espionage, and Professional Secrets, and Article 47, Federal Banking Law of Nov. 8, 1934
Governing Banking Secrecy.
20. Supra note 4, at 103.
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agents, and commissioners. Article 15 permits a diplomatic officer or
consulate agent to take evidence from a national of his own State, in
civil or commercial matters, within the foreign Contracting State
where he or she is employed. Article 16 extends this permission to
evidence sought from nationals of the State wherein the officers or
agents exercise their functions or from nationals of a third State,
with the permission of and under the conditions set forth by the
State of Execution. This same authority has been extended to com-
missioners by Article 17.
Articles 15, 16 and 17 confirm that the taking of evidence
thereunder is without compulsion. Article 15 allows a State to de-
clare that permission must first be obtained from the state of execu-
tion before employment of this method of evidence gathering. On the
other hand, Article 16 and 17 permit declarations that prior permis-
sion is not required. Like Article 1, Articles 15, 16 and 17 employ
the permissive language "may." As was argued above, the use of this
language emphasizes that optional methods are provided by the Con-
vention itself. These three sections set forth alternatives to the proce-
dure set forth in Article 1, the Letter of Request.21
Article 18 permits declaration by the States that the three types
of agents described in Chapter II may apply to the authority for
assistance in obtaining evidence. Powers granted to the authority
permitting use of Article 15-18, provision for legal representation,
and the specific rules governing the taking of evidence by these three
agents are dealt with, respectively, in Article 19, 20, and 21. Article
22 asserts that a failure of the method set forth in this Chapter does
not foreclose the employment of Chapter I methods. This provision,
as well, adds weight to the argument that "may" in the Prologue is
necessary to point out that options within the Convention exist."
C. Chapter III
Chapter III sets out general clauses regulating the use of the
Convention. Article 23, one of the Convention's most controversial
provisions, allows a Contracting State to declare that it will not "ex-
ecute Letters of Request issued for the purpose of obtaining pretrial
discovery of documents as known in Common Law countries."23 All
Convention countries except the U.S., Barbados, Cyprus, Israel, and
Czechoslovakia have registered an Article 23 declaration.2 The limi-
tation or opt-out provision of Article 23 refers only to documents and
not to other forms of pretrial discovery. Although many opponents of
21. Charter II of the Hague Evidence Convention.
22. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
23. Article 23 of the Hague Evidence Convention.
24. 28 U.S.C. § 1781 (1988 Supp.).
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the exclusive or mandatory view of the Convention look to Article 23
as evidence of its optional status, it is clear that this Article has been
grossly misunderstood. The provision was included at the request of
the United Kingdom to limit requests for documents which lack
specificity, for example "produce all other documents" or "state all
relevant documents.9
2 5
When the Article 23 issue was discussed at the meeting of the
Special Commission, it became clear that a misunderstanding had
ensued from poor drafting. 6 The States which invoked the Article
23 option apparently believed that "pre-trial discovery" permitted
American litigants to employ discovery procedures prior to institut-
ing an action, to see if any information might be gathered which
could then form the basis of a suit; the option was not invoked as a
blanket refusal to comply with any U.S. requests prior to the time of
trial.2 8 After clarification, these States agreed to rethink their Arti-
cle 23 restrictions.2 Finland, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, and the
Netherlands have already modified their opt-out declaration, joining
the United Kingdom, to permit pretrial discovery of specifically des-
ignated documents as opposed to "all or other documents." 0
Article 24 permits the designation of authorities as a receiving
body, other than the Central Authority, permitting more than one
Central Authority in Federal States. Article 25 concerns the desig-
nation of authorities for States with more than one legal system. Re-
imbursement of costs in special constitutional situations is addressed
in Article 26. Article 27 enables a Convention State to permit other,
less restrictive methods and procedures for evidence gathering than
those set forth in the Convention. It is submitted that this Article
has been misconstrued by those suggesting that the Convention is
merely optional. Such a reading renders the entire Convention super-
fluous. Article 27 is obviously directed at civil law countries, permit-
ting them to move even closer to U.S. broad evidence gathering
methods if they choose. At the meeting of the Special Commission,
in 1978, it was noted that no State had invoked Article 27 options,81
and to date no significant declaration has been made.32
Article 28 enumerates those provisions of the Convention which
can be modified by agreement between contracting states. Provisions
concerning States which are members of previous Hague Conven-
25. See supra note 10, at 1427-1428.
26. Id.
27. See supra note 7, at 1421.
28. See supra note 10, at 1428.
29. See supra note 7, at 1424; supra note 10, at 1428.
30. 28 U.S.C. § 1781 (1988 Supp.).
31. See supra note 10, at 1433.
32. 28 U.S.C. § 1781 (1988 Supp.).
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tions on Civil Procedure are found in Articles 29, 30, 31, and 32.
Article 33 explains reservations and Article 34 concerns declara-
tions. Article 35 provides that designations, declarations, and reser-
vations be filed with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Nether-
lands. Settlement of Convention conflicts by diplomatic channels is
mandated by Article 36. Ratification, effective dates, accession to
the Convention, extension of the Convention to territories of the
States, duration, denunciation, tacit renewal of the Convention, and
notices given by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands
to the States are addressed in Articles 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, and 42,
respectively.
In summary, the Hague Evidence Convention sets out proce-
dures, replete with available options, governing the taking of evi-
dence in foreign Contracting States. The Convention goal of provid-
ing evidence to litigants in the requesting State while minimizing the
interference with evidence and procedural rules of the executing
State was reached by striking a balancing between the broad U.S.
methods and the narrower civil law procedures.
Although with this compromise the Convention effectively
bridged the common law/civil law procedural gap, resort to the Con-
vention on only an optional basis widens the jurisprudential chasm.
Those who assert that the convention is optional and supplemental,
as opposed to mandatory and exclusive, point to the Convention's
permissive language, used in Articles 1, 15, 16, and 17, as support
for their position. Drawing the conclusion that the Convention is op-
tional, merely because permissive words are used, however, seems
specious at best, as the Convention provides for various methods of
taking evidence. The permissive language is better interpreted to re-
fer to the option of using one of these methods provided as opposed
to using the others.
III. A Closer Look at the Options
Six different interpretations of the Convention have been postu-
lated, governing the relationship of the Convention to the internal
evidence rules of U.S. jurisdictions. Most of these interpretations
were considered in the Aerospatiale decision. Each will be addressed
at length.
A. Treaty Supreme
As previously noted, it may be contended that the procedures
established by the Convention are permissive. This contention, how-
ever, renders the entire exercise in meeting, compromising, drafting,
and adopting the Convention procedures meaningless. To promulgate
a treaty or Convention which the parties may or may not recognize
Fall 1988]
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or apply seem to be a useless act. A more reasonable interpretation
of the "may" language is that pointed out by Professor Bishop."3
Bishop argues that although the Convention does not expressly
state that it was intended to be exclusive, neither does it indicate
that it was not to be exclusive. The permissive language of the Con-
vention (the use of the word "may") reflects the choice available to
litigants to utilize one of the three alternate methods of obtaining
evidence provided in the Convention. Bishop submits that the com-
prehensiveness of the Convention and the provisions allowing coun-
tries to agree among themselves to other procedures (which would be
unnecessary if the Convention were entirely permissive) is further
evidence of the intended exclusiveness of the Convention. He as-
tutely observes that interpretations by other countries and the origi-
nal interpretation espoused in the first of three U.S. agency amicus
briefs support the position that the Convention was intended to be
exclusive.
Certainly the Convention and its discovery procedures would be
supreme when juxtaposed with state discovery laws. The second par-
agraph of Article VI of the Constitution of the United States
provides:
This Constitution and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or
which shall be made under the Authority of the United States,
shall be the supreme Law of the Land; the Judges in every State
shall be bound thereby, and any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
Thus, the Constitution of the United States dictates that the Con-
vention should certainly prevail over inconsistent provisions of state
statutes. " .. . [T]he treaty making power is independent of and
superior to the legislative power of the states, the meaning of treaty
provisions so construed is not restricted by any necessity of avoiding
possible conflict with state legislation and when so ascertained must
prevail over inconsistent state enactments . . . 81
It is unnecessary to review the debate that exists as to whether
the supremacy clause of the Constitution was intended to grant trea-
ties supremacy over federal law or whether the two were deemed to
be on the same footing, as even under the latter interpretation the
Hague Convention would supersede any conflicting provisions of the
33. Bishop, Significant Issues in the Construction of the Hague Evidence Convention, I
INT'L LITIGATION Q. 2 (1985).
34. Neilson v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 47 (1929). See also U.S. v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407
(1886); Amaya v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 158 F.2d 554 (5th Cir. 1946), cert. den. 331 U.S.
808 (1947), reh'g. den. 331 U.S. 867 (1947); Blake v. Arnett, 663 F.2d 906 (9th Cir. 1981);
Holguin v. Elephant Butte Irrigation District, 91 N.M. 398, 575 P.2d 88 (1977); and Ex Parte
Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 443 So.2d 880 (Ala. 1983).
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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This result is dictated by the "last
in time" doctrine, described long ago in The Cherokee Tobacco dic-
tates the following result:
The effect of treaties and acts of Congress, when in conflict,
is not settled by the Constitution. But the question is not in-
volved in any doubt as to its proper solution. A treaty may su-
persede a prior act of Congress and an act of Congress may su-
persede a prior treaty. s5
This doctrine has been applied regularly since that date."6 Conflict-
ing provisions of Federal Rules of Civil Procedures concerning the
scope of discovery and sanctions for failure of compliance predate
the effective date of the Hague Convention.
Other commentators also assert that the Hague discovery Con-
vention is the exclusive means governing international procedure
abroad. They concur with the Bishop position that the permissive
language simply grants to signatories permission to use letters of re-
quest to obtain discovery as opposed to the alternative procedures
provided by the Convention.8 7
B. Hague First
The second interpretive option available requires that the Hague
Convention be employed first in all instances. According to this in-
terpretation, should that course be ineffective, a litigant would then
be free to resort to procedures under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Several United States courts which considered the issue prior to
the Aerospatiale decision have adopted this position. The California
court in Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Superior Courts8
modified its earlier position taken in Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesell-
schaft v. Superior Court.9 The court carefully balanced the inter-
ests of the litigants with the sensitivities of the West German author-
ities. In Volkswagenwerk, inspection of premises and documents was
requested, as well as interviews and depositions of persons in Ger-
35. 11 Wall. 616, 624, 78 U.S. 616 (1870).
36. See. e.g., Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580 (1884); Chae Chan Ping v. United
States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889); Travelers Insurance Co. v. Panama-Williams, Inc., 597 F.2d 702
(10th Cir. 1979); U.S. v. Crittenden, 600 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1979) ("... we see no reason
why we should not apply the most basic principle of statutory interpretation, (not to mention,
of leap-frog itself). That principle, of course, is that the last leap wins.").
37. See, e.g., McLean, The Hague Evidence Convention: Its Impact On American Civil
Procedure, 9 Loy L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 17 (1986). McLean also argues effectively that the
trend in our courts to hold that the Convention is merely permissive or optional will ultimately
be detrimental to the United States in international relations.
38. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Superior Court, 123 Cal. App.3d 840, 176
Cal. Rptr. 874 (1981).
39. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. App.3d 503, 109 Cal.
Rptr. 219 (1973).
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many. In holding that first resort must be taken to Hague proce-
dures, the court stated:
We regard our conclusion as an exercise in judicial self-re-
straint designed to serve what we regard as important interna-
tional goals. We could perhaps read the Hague Convention
broadly as a preemptive and exclusive rule of international evi-
dence-gathering, binding upon us as the supreme law of the land
under section 2 of article VI of the Federal Constitution. But we
prefer to believe that the Hague Convention establishes not a
fixed rule but rather a minimum measure of international coop-
eration; a reading of Article 27 of the Convention encourages us
to conclude that this is indeed what the ratifying states intend.40
The California court applied the same principles in Pierburg
GmbH & Co. KG v. Superior Court,41 wherein a plaintiff served 315
interrogatories, exclusive of subparts, upon the defendant, a West
German corporation, without using Hague procedures. The court ob-
served that "[tihe foundation of the Convention is to avoid interna-
tional friction where a domestic state court orders civil discovery to
be conducted within the territory of a civil law nation that views
such unilateral conduct as an intrusion upon its judicial sover-
eignty."42 The court indicated that the United States was bound by
the Convention as the supreme law of its land, and that judges are
bound thereby as well. Hence, plaintiffs, therefore, were required to
use the Convention first to obtain answers, seeking the cooperation
and advice of West German attorneys and officials.
The Philadelphia Gear case,48 in the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania, likewise considered the Hague Convention the avenue of
first resort. The court determined that it was not for the forum court
to supplement the Hague rules and that first use of the Hague Con-
vention was required. Thus, the plaintiff's motion to compel a West
German corporate defendant to answer interrogatories and produce
documents was denied. To the same effect was the Eickhoff deci-
sion" in which a West German corporation, through its American
subsidiary, successfully terminated pretrial discovery.
40. Volkswagenwerk, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 885-86.
41. Pierburg GmbH & Co. KG v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App.3d 238, 186 Cal. Rptr.
876 (1982).
42. Id. at 881.
43. Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. American Pfauter Corp., 100 F.R.D. 58 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
44. Gebr. Eickhoff Maschinenfabrik und Eisengieberei GmbH v. Starcher, 328 S.E.2d
492 (W. Va. 1985). Application of a first resort requirement is also evidenced in Vincent v.
Ateliers de la Motobecane, S.A., 193 N.J. Super. 716, 475 A.2d 686 (1984) and T.H. Gold-
schmidt, A.G. v. Smith, 676 S.W.2d 443 (Tx. App. I Dist. 1984).
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C. Hague Intended for Non-U.S. Discovery
The third option involves a determination that the intention of
Hague was to limit its application to discovery of evidence which is
outside the forum country. In other words, the Federal Rules could
apply to the gathering of evidence which would occur within the
United States, but Hague would govern depositions and documents
sought beyond our territory. Some aspects of the Messerschmitt
case45 suggest this as a solution.
The Messerschmitt court determined that the Hague Conven-
tion did not apply to persons over whom the court had jurisdiction or
to discovery which could occur in the United States. Accordingly,
U.S. courts would not directly impose upon, for example, Germany
or the German judicial system and the protection Germany seeks to
provide its own nationals through its own internal procedural safe-
guards, when the objects of discovery are located in the United
States. The court indicated that it would be patently unfair to permit
a German defendant to take depositions here and to forbid the plain-
tiff to depose the German nationals who are located in the United
States. The court conceded that taking deposition abroad raised an-
other question.
The magistrate who originally considered the discovery requests
in the Aerospatiale case in the U.S. District Court in Iowa con-
cluded that the interests of the United States were stronger than
those of France, particularly because compliance with the request for
discovery would not have to take place in France. This concept of
territory and the relationship of jurisdiction to territory is a well rec-
ognized American principle, in the Pennoyer v. Neff4" vein.
This option has indeed a built-in problem. For the American
courts to adopt such a position, a document drain away from this
country to foreign climes could be expected in anticipation that our
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and attendant sanctions for non-
compliance could not follow those documents.
D. Hague for Non-Party Discovery
A fourth option, and one which seemingly has some merit on its
face, is to interpret the Hague Convention as not being applicable to
parties over whom the court has jurisdiction.47 On the surface, this
approach certainly seems fair when one merely seeks to impose upon
45. In re Messerschmitt Bolkow Blohm GmbH, 757 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1985).
46. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 24 L.Ed. 5765 (1877).
47. See D. MCINERNEY, Effect of the Hague Evidence Convention on Federal and State
Discovery Procedures, FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 353 (Chapter 17), wherein the author main-
tains with some force that the Convention procedures are mandatory only when dealing with a
foreign non-party over whom the court has no jurisdiction.
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foreign plaintiffs who utilize our courts the obligation to submit
themselves to the rules applicable to proceedings in our courts. The
issue becomes somewhat less clear, however, when the rules are im-
posed upon a defendant who is involuntarily summoned into an
American court.
An argument popular with American plaintiffs is that a foreign
corporation or person who elects to have such contacts with the
United States which would enable them to do business, to make a
profit, or enjoy the benefits of this country also subjects itself to the
procedural rules of our court system when subject to litigation here.
With the benefits of the American economy and free enterprise sys-
tem come the liabilities or obligations attendant upon those rights.
One response to this argument is that the American concept of
long-arm jurisdiction also differs from that concept in Europe, in the,
same fashion in which evidence and discovery rules differ. Few Euro-
pean jurisdictions "enjoy" the liberality of the minimum contacts
rules of the U.S. Most civil law countries have no International Shoe
concept and are often surprised by the perceived presumptuousness
of our courts in reaching outside their borders to obtain jurisdiction
over foreign nationals.
This option, which limits the Hague Convention to discovery of
non-party witnesses and documents, is a popular one. The U.S. Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in the Aerospatiale
case held that "[w]hen the district court has jurisdiction over a for-
eign litigant, the Hague Convention does not apply to the production
of evidence in that litigant's possession, even though the documents
and information sought may physically be located within the terri-
tory of a foreign signatory to the Convention.""8 This rationale is
espoused in the Fifth Circuit Anscheutz case,49 where the court held
that where in personam jurisdiction has been obtained the Federal
Rules would be applicable to that defendant. Likewise, the Lasky
case,5" in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, likewise stands for
the proposition that the Hague Convention was permissive in nature,
and the Federal Rules applies where the court had jurisdiction over
the party from whom discovery was sought. Though that court did
give some lip service to principles of comity, it suggested that plain-
tiffs should not be delayed when it is apparent that the country
where discovery is sought is unlikely to honor a pretrial discovery
letter of request.
The counter-argument often made is that even if foreign busi-
nesses are subject to American courts and laws, the Hague Conven-
48. Aerospatiale, 782 F.2d 120, 124 (8th Cir. 1986).
49. In re Anschuetz & Co., GmbH, 754 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1985).
50. Lasky v. Continental Products Corp., 569 F. Supp. 1227 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
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tion is part of U.S. law. Thus, should application of Convention pro-
cedures be detrimental to a U.S. citizen, but beneficial to the U.S.,
through its treaty makers and Senate, elected to make the Conven-
tion the law, to the benefit of international relations, and, as part of
a national diplomatic policy, the Convention must be applied in our
court system. This circuitous argument begs the question by assum-
ing an intention to apply the Convention exclusively in such circum-
stances in the first place, which is the issue to be resolved.
E. Federal Rules Apply but Comity Principles must be Applied to
Determine Whether Resort to Hague is First Required
Perhaps the Laskey case, as well as Laker Airways Ltd.,51 more
properly could be considered to fall within the fifth option, which we
will find to be the one the Supreme Court adopted in Aerospatiale.
Under this analysis, the Federal Rules are deemed applicable to liti-
gation in the United States, but the court must first look to comity
principles and apply a balancing test to determine whether there
should be in fact a first resort to the Hague Convention.
The problem with the high-sounding application of comity prin-
ciples is that we are left with uncertainty and an absence of the
bright line that lawyers, and particularly persons in business, hope to
find in determining rights and obligations. Mr. Justice Gray, in his
66 page opinion in Hilton v. Guyot,52 analyzed the principle of com-
ity as it relates to the enforcement of foreign judgments. Justice
Gray in quoting Mr. Justice Porter of the Supreme Court of Louisi-
ana, observed that
e . . comity is, and ever must be, uncertain; that it must neces-
sarily depend on a variety of circumstances which cannot be re-
duced to any certain rule; . . . . that in the conflict of laws it
must often be a matter of doubt which should prevail; and that,
whenever a doubt does exist, the court which decides, will prefer
the laws of its own country to that of a stranger.58
A second observation by Professors Bernhard Grossfeld and C. Paul
Rogers, in their article A Shared Values Approach to Jurisdictional
Conflicts in International Economic Law,54 is apt, albeit related to
jurisdictional issues in an antitrust context:
Further, an approach which requires an American judge to
trade off foreign interests with United States interests in a suit
in which the plaintiff is typically American and the defendant
51. Laker Airways Ltd. v. Pan American World Airways, 103 F.R.D. 42 (D.D.C.
1984).
52. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
53. Id. at 164-165.
54. 32 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 931 (1983).
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typically foreign is inherently suspect . . . Then one is bound
to view the foreign interests in the confines of his or her own
legal system, resulting in a distorted perception of a foreign
interest.?5
Comity has been part of international law, expressly or implicitly,
since its beginning. No bright line here. No blacks and whites. The
principle is gray and often criticized. Comity is neither a matter of
absolute obligation on one hand nor of mere courtesy or good will on
the other. Simply stated, comity is a recognition that one nation
gives in its territory to the acts of a sister nation having due regard
both to international duty and convenience as well as to the rights of
its own citizens and other persons under the protection of its laws.56
F. Federal Rules Supreme (When in Rome)
The sixth option available is perhaps the most radical. Its pre-
mise that the Federal Rules are in fact supreme has been summarily
rejected. Such a view carries to the limit the concept that the Hague
Convention is permissive and merely affords parties an option which
they may or may not wish to utilize. The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure control, as would state procedure in a state court case.
The Laker case perhaps comes closest to articulating that view.
It held suggesting that the Federal Rules apply in our federal courts.
The court stressed that the Hague Convention was not designed to
inhibit the gathering of evidence, but only to increase possibilities
and options. 57 To suggest, however, that a treaty of the U.S.,
promulgated to provide an international procedure for evidence gath-
ering, can be totally ignored and deemed inapplicable by a court in
this country or elsewhere is totally without reason. This is particu-
larly true when the Convention itself provides a specific procedure
for opting out of certain of its provisions.58
IV. Aerospatiale in Brief
In Societe Nationale Industrielle Aeorospatiale and Societe De
Construction D'Avions De Tourism v. United States District Court
For the Southern District of Iowa, - U.S. -, 107 S. Ct. 2542
55. Id. at 936.
56. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895).
57. In an excellent study, see Axel Heck U.S. Misinterpretation of the Hague Evidence
Convention, 24 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 231 (1986), analyzes the Convention beginning with
the premise that the concept of discovery is alien to most other legal systems and reminding us
that the Convention concept was initiated by the United States. Mr. Heck asserts that United
States courts have actually breached international obligations established by the treaty in their
insistence that they retain jurisdiction imposing sanction of the Federal Rules upon foreign
nationals.
58. A Rallye is a type of short takeoff and landing (STOL) aircraft.
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(1987) [hereinafter Aerospatiale], the Supreme Court of the United
States addresses head-on the question of whether the Convention
provides an exclusive, mandatory procedure for taking evidence
abroad, or is applicable only under certain circumstances, or is
merely an available option. The case arose from the crash, on Au-
gust 19, 1980, of a Rallye59 airplane, manufactured by the defend-
ants. The crash occurred in Iowa. The plaintiffs instituted suit in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa
against Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale, a corporation
which is wholly owned by the Government of France, and Societe de
Construction d'Avions de Tourism, a wholly owned subsidiary of So-
ciete Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale.
The defendants complied with initial discovery requests under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to the extent that the informa-
tion sought and furnished was located in the United States. Upon
subsequent discovery requests, however, the defendants moved for a
protective order, asserting that the Hague Evidence Convention pro-
vided the exclusive means for obtaining such discovery and further
asserted that a French blocking statute"0 proscribed their compliance
with the requests. The Magistrate denied the defendants' motion di-
rected at answering interrogatories, producing documents, and mak-
ing admissions which could be accomplished in the U.S. Denial was
based on the ground that requiring resort to the Hague Evidence
Convention for discovery in the U.S. would contravene United
States' interests in protecting its citizens. (Option 3). The Magis-
trate granted the order requested as to oral depositions taken in
France. He further decided that the blocking statute was not a fac-
tor since it was undetermined whether the statute would be applied
to these discovery requests. The magistrate also concluded that
United States' interests outweighed French interests.
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit6' denied the de-
fendants' petition for a write of mandamus, holding that the Hague
Evidence Convention applies to obtaining evidence from nonparties,
but is not applicable to discovery requests from a foreign party prop-
erly subject to the court's jurisdiction. (Option 4). The court rejected
59. French Penal Code Law No. 80-538. As the Supreme Court reported, in footnote 6
to the Majority Opinion, Article IA of this so-called blocking statute provides, in pertinent
part:
Subject to treaties or international agreements . . . it is prohibited for any
party to request, seek, or disclose . . . documents or information leading to the
constitution of evidence with a view to foreign judicial or administrative proceed-
ings or in connection therewith.
60. 782 F.2d 120 (8th Cir. 1986).
61. A first resort approach requires that the Hague Evidence Convention be employed in
the first instance; if this approach proves unsuccessful, discovery may then proceed pursuant to
the broader discovery rules of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
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a "first resort" approach,6" based on international comity, and noted
that existence of the blocking statute is relevant when considering
the propriety of the discovery order and the imposition of sanctions
for noncompliance.
The Supreme Court of the United States, in a five to four deci-
sion,68 vacated the Eighth Circuit's decision and remanded. The
Court held that although the Hague Evidence Convention is not ex-
clusive or mandatory, the Court of Appeals was incorrect in sug-
gesting that it is not even applicable to a foreign party subject to the
court's jurisdiction. The Court further held that principles of comity
must be utilized, but that the first resort approach is not required.
Justice Blackmun, although concurring with the Majority's rejection
of the extreme views, endorses a first resort approach.
To determine whether Convention procedures must be followed,
the Court mandates a case by case analysis applying principles of
comity. The comity analysis of the Restatement of Foreign Relations
Law of the United States, recognized by the Court in footnote 28 to
the Majority opinion in the Aerospatiale case suggests the following
factors to be relevant in any comity analysis:
(1) The importance to the . . . litigation of the documents
or other information requested;
(2) The degree of specificity of the request;
(3) Whether the information originated in the United
States;
(4) The availability of alternative means of securing the
information;
(5) The extent to which noncompliance with the request
would undermine important interests of the United States or
compliance with the request would undermine important inter-
ests of the state where the information is located."'
European scholars have expressed great disappointment in the
Aerospatiale result. Professor Nicolo Trocker of the University of
Siena and the University of Florence Law Schools, for example, has
expressed a typical European flabbergastation. Trocker cannot un-
derstand that courts, particularly at the trial level, can be given the
apparent power to apply or not apply provisions of a treaty sought
first by the U.S. and designed to effect a compromise between the
62. Joining Justice Stevens in the opinion of the Court were Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices White, Powell, and Scalia. Joining Justice Blackmun, concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part, were Justices Brennan, Marshall, and O'Connor.
63. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (REVISED) §
437(1)(c) (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1986), as cited by the Court in footnote 28 to the Majority
Opinion.
64. Lecture by Professor Nicolo Trocker "Transnational and Comparative Civil Litiga-
tion" at the University of Florence, Florence Italy (June 1987).
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discovery system unique to the United States and- the totally differ-
ent concept of evidence taking prevalent in Europe, particularly on
the continent.
65
V. Litigation in the Civil Law Court
To understand the position of Professor Trocker and the other
European critics of the Aerospatiale decision, one must remind one-
self that the civil trial outside the common law system varies greatly
from ours. The lawyer in civil litigation serves a much different func-
tion on the continent of Europe than a courtroom lawyer serves in
the United States. The role of the judge differs as well.
A. Pretrial Discovery
Pretrial discovery in civil law countries in any formal sense is
almost unknown. Pretrial taking of evidence by attorneys for the
purpose of discovering relevant evidence or materials which could
lead to relevant evidence is generally not permitted. Even in the
common law motherland, the United Kingdom, blanket pretrial re-
quests for documents, for instance, are not honored. No matter
which of the available procedures are used to obtain the assistance of
a British court in securing documents in Britain, the most certain
way to guarantee refusal of a court to assist is to request "all docu-
ments relating to . . ." or "any other . . . ." Assistance will, how-
ever, be given by British courts when specific requests are made for
specific documents held by specific persons.6
Privileges protecting documents from discovery and subpoena
are considerably broader in many European countries than in the
U.S. West Germany in particular is extremely protective of business
secrets and records.6 7 The privacy of business documents and indi-
viduals is at the heart of some of these continental legal systems,
particularly that of Germany, perhaps as a result of political exper-
iences of the past. There is a lurking fear of state totalitarianism.
The protection of individual documents as well as evidence to be
given by individuals tends to offset the traditional role of the state in
gathering evidence.
B. Duty of Securing Evidence
In civil law countries it is the rule that the state, rather than
65. See supra note 4, at 86.
66. "During the course of examination we were met with one major obstacle, which was
the German business secret privilege . . . . but the witnesses ultimately testified fully once
assured that they could stop whenever they wished." Platto, supra note 18, at 584-5.
67. B. Kaplan, Civil Procedure-Reflections on the Comparison of Systems, 9 BUFF. L.
REV. 409 (1960).
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private counsel, has the evidence-gathering function through its judi-
ciary. 8 Kaplan mentions that Germans apply the principle of jure
novit curia - the court knows without help from counsel and "law-
yer participation is likely to be meager.'
In a civil trial on the continent, evidence is taken by the judge.
Logical relevance and the absence of an applicable privilege are gen-
erally the only criteria for admission of evidence. The judge conducts
the examination of witnesses in an inquisitorial style as opposed to
use of the adversary system as is employed in this country. It is the
role of the court, not counsel, to obtain evidence. Counsel may only
offer some guidance and some subtle suggestions."0
The civil trial on the continent is also episodic in nature. In one
aspect it appears to be one long segmented pretrial conference with
the judge wielding the net searching for sources of proof. Misunder-
standing by a jury is of no concern because of the absence of juries
in most civil trials. Evidence is not even a separate topic in the law
or in law schools. Instead, it falls within the ambit of civil
procedure. 1
C. Secrecy Laws
Banking secrecy laws in Switzerland prevent access to docu-
ments which would be easily accessible in this country. Many civil
actions brought before a U.S. court by agencies such as the Securi-
ties Exchange Commission, Internal Revenue Service, and the like,
would be regarded in Switzerland as administrative matters for
which no legal assistance is available. The Swiss also include in
their penal code provisions protection for business and manufactur-
ing secrets, much as the West Germans do. 3 Violation of the so-
called secrecy laws can subject the violator to criminal prosecution.
Swiss law prohibits the production of documents other than through
a request for intergovernmental assistance. 4 Anyone attempting to
68. See supra note 66.
69. See supra note 63. Professor Trocker refers to the implicit "three question rule"
which suggests that a lawyer might suggest to the court three questions that the court could
ask of witnesses. Any more than three and the court often takes offense.
70. As of our exclusionary rules dwindle, particularly under the new Federal Rules of
Evidence approach in the United States, are we not indeed growing closer to the continental
model? Perhaps the Europeans are also approaching us. In Corning Glass Works v. I.T.T.,
supra note 18, the German judges permitted our lawyers to participate in cross examination,
an anomaly in the German civil trial.
71. J. Schwarz, A View From Abroad-Obtaining Evidence In Switzerland, Interna-
tional Litigation and Arbitration: Practical Approaches and Considerations, in II ABA SEC-
TION OF LITIGATION & ABA SECTION OF INT'L L. & PRAC. 61 (1987).
72. See supra note 19.
73. Id.
74. See, e.g., France: Commercial Documents Act 1968-80, and Decree No. 81-550 of
12 May 1981, Concerning the Transmission of Documents or Information of an Economic,
Commercial or Technical Nature to Foreign Individuals or Legal Persons; United Kingdom:
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take evidence on Swiss territory in violation of requirements is sub-
ject to imprisonment. Because of the extensive secrecy laws in Swit-
zerland, Germany and other civil law countries and the fact that the
court - the judge - is an arm of the state which is charged with
the duty of taking evidence, an invasion of these state prerogatives
constitutes, in the minds of Europeans, an offense to the sovereignty
of the nation.
D. Blocking Statutes
Because it is a matter of sovereignty and because of the serious-
ness of the invasion by American litigants, many European countries
have enacted so-called blocking statutes.75 Blocking statutes, in ef-
fect, prevent a national of the enacting country from producing doc-
uments or giving evidence when sought by American litigants under
American discovery rules. The enactment of the blocking statutes
has oft been used as argument by those advocating a firm enforce-
ment of sanctions under our own discovery rules in response to the
European blocking efforts. This argument fails upon close examina-
tion of the offending foreign statutes. Blocking is dictated by these
laws only when Hague Convention procedures are not used. The pur-
pose of the statutes, therefore, is obviously not to frustrate American
litigants in their effort to obtain information, but rather to force
American litigants to follow the procedures to which they have
ascribed by ratification of the Convention. Further, these statutes
demonstrate a commitment of nations, which in their internal juris-
prudence lack discovery concepts, to permit discovery despite their
own reluctance when Hague procedures are followed. Rather than
evidencing a total opposition to American-style discovery, these stat-
utes are a recognition by other signatory states of the compromise
position dictated by the Convention and of its mandatory nature.
Thus, the offense to our fellow signatories by U.S. failure to
follow the Hague procedures is not simply based upon their percep-
tion that Americans have chosen to ignore an international agree-
ment to which they are a party. But more importantly, also because
in so doing the U.S. is also committing - and continuing to commit
- an offense against their national sovereignty.
VI. Reasoning of Aerospatiale
In reaching is conclusion that Federal Rules can be used after
balancing interests under comity principles, the Supreme Court re-
lies heavily on the text of the Hague Evidence Convention. Immedi-
c.34 Evidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act 1975.
75. __ U.S .. , 107 S. Ct. 2542, 2550.
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ately, Court notes the relationship between the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and the Hague Evidence Convention:
First, the Hague Convention might be read as requiring its use
to the exclusion of any other discovery procedures whenever evi-
dence located abroad is sought for use in an American court.
Second, the Hague Convention might be interpreted to require
first, but not exclusive, use of its procedures . . . . Third, then,
the Convention might be viewed as establishing a supplemental
set of discovery procedures, strictly optional under treaty law, to
which concerns of comity nevertheless require first resort by
American courts in all cases. Fourth, the treaty may be viewed
as an undertaking among sovereigns to facilitate discovery to
which an American court should resort when it deems that
course of action appropriate, after considering the situations of
the parties before it as well as the interests of the concerned
foreign state.7"
The Court promptly rejects its own first and second options
since they are not supported by the text or the history of the Conven-
tion. The Court first notes the absence of mandatory language in the
Preamble, in contradistinction to the Hague Service Convention77
which was drafted prior to the Hague Evidence Convention, and the
absence of any mandatory, exclusive, or limiting language within the
text of the Convention itself. The Court highlights to the permissive
language, employed in Chapters I and II of the Convention, as fur-
ther support of its conclusion that the Convention is optional. Addi-
tionally, the Court asserts that Article 23, permitting a declaration
by a Convention State that it will not execute a letter of request for
purposes of pretrial document discovery, and Article 27, allowing
Convention States to employ broader procedures than those set forth
in the Convention, also support this conclusion. The Court fails to
note that a conclusion that Convention procedures were only optional
would render Article 27 totally superfluous.
The Court mentions other factors in the footnotes which are
deemed to belie the mandatory nature of the Convention. These are
the position of the United States Government, excerpts from
Amram's Report, and three "insurmountable" asymmetries which
the Court believed result from a holding of exclusivity, namely an
76. 20 U.S.T. 361, T.I.A.S. No. 6638.
77. See - U.S. ._ 107 S. Ct. 2542, 2555 (footnote omitted) (1987). Inter-
estingly, though, the Court did not consider the country's overriding interest in maintaining
harmonious international relations.
The practicing bar seems to disagree with the Court's contention here, though. Robert F.
Brodegaard, a member of Weil, Gotshal and Manges in New York City, notes that one of the
advantages in utilizing Convention procedures is its time-saving features, reducing discovery-
gathering time from years to a few months. Victory Abroad: A Guide to Foreign Discovery, 14
LITIGATION 27, 29 (Winter 1988).
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advantage to a foreign party who can proceed with discovery via the
Federal Rules, a competitive advantage to foreign companies, and an
advantage to some American parties depending on whether the op-
posing foreign party is a national of a contracting State.
The Court also employs the text of the Convention when it con-
cludes that the Court of Appeals was incorrect in holding that the
Convention was not applicable to foreign parties subject to the
court's jurisdiction. The Supreme Court correctly observed that the
Convention itself does not distinguish parties from nonparties or evi-
dence within the control of a party in the forum country from evi-
dence abroad. Thus, although it is not exclusive, the Court held that
the Convention is applicable in the sense that it is an option to which
a party may resort.
Conceding that the Convention is a viable option, the Court de-
clines to adopt a first resort rule. The rationale for this conclusion
seems to be an unsupported assertion that the Convention procedures
would frequently be "unduly time consuming and expensive, as well
as less certain to produce needed evidence than direct use of the
Federal Rules . . . .[and] therefore inconsistent with the overriding
interest in the 'just, speedy, and inexpensive determination' of litiga-
tion in our courts." 8 Although the Court states that it did not be-
lieve that foreign States would be offended by a first resort approach,
knowing that refusal by an executing state could result in a subse-
quent overriding of that decision by discovery ordered by U.S. courts
under the Federal Rules, it nonetheless held that the first resort ap-
proach is not required as a matter of comity since the language of
the Convention does not so mandate.
The application, on a case by case basis, of a spongy comity
criterion will hardly encourage certainly in the law. Additionally, the
lower court, as part of the balancing process, is required by the Aer-
ospatiale decision to "supervise closely" discovery procedures in or-
der to determine the intrusiveness or reasonableness and the inappro-
priateness or appropriateness of Convention use as opposed to the
Federal Rules application of each device employed. This will burden
the court by requiring it to endure much costly and arbitrary deci-
sion making.
Thus, the Court concluded that the Hague Evidence Convention
is not exclusive, that the Convention nonetheless does apply to for-
eign parties properly subject to an American court's jurisdiction, and
that a first resort approach is not required. In so holding, the Court
admonished that such discovery must be supervised with diligence
and care. Specific guidelines for the lower courts, however, were not
78. - U.S. . . n.4, 107 S. Ct. 2542, 2555 (citations omitted).
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enumerated.
VII. Reasoning of Blackmun Dissent.
In his separate opinion, Justice Blackmun agrees with the Ma-
jority's conclusions that the Hague Evidence Convention is applica-
ble to foreign parties properly subject to the court's jurisdiction, such
as the case here, and that the Convention does not provide the exclu-
sive means for obtaining evidence abroad. He disagreed, however,
with the Court's rejection of the first resort approach and its advo-
cating a case-by-case analysis for which it provided little guidance.
Blackmun suggested that the Convention is in the United
States' best interest, despite the restraint on commonly used discov-
ery techniques, by opening up previously unavailable avenues for dis-
covery and by promoting international harmony. He noted that the
concessions made by the other Convention countries, particularly the
civil law nations, in tolerating broader, foreign discovery methods
makes it clear that the signatory countries expected first resort by
the United States.
Blackmun criticizes the Court's leaving lower courts the option
to require or not require use of the Convention, as such decision is a
"political determination," better left to the executive or legislative
branches. Not only are courts inexperienced in considering the inter-
ests of foreign nations, but they are liable to be subject to a "pro-
forum bias." In a footnote, the Justice declared:
[o]ne of the ways that a pro-forum bias has manifested itself is
in United States courts' preoccupation with their own power to
issue discovery orders. All too often courts have regarded the
Convention as some kind of threat to their jurisdiction and have
rejected use of the treaty procedures .. . .There is also a ten-
dency on the part of courts, perhaps unrecognized, to view a dis-
pute from a local perspective. ". . . [C]ourts inherently find it
difficult neutrally to balance competing foreign interests. When
there is any doubt, national interests will tend to be favored over
foreign interests."79
Blackmun also differs with the Majority in its view that comity
concerns dictate inquiry on a case-by-case basis. The Justice offers a
three prong comity analysis. The interests of the foreign State, the
interests of the United States, and the interests of all nations in
maintaining a harmonious international legal system. Blackmun ex-
plains how the Majority erred in its analysis of these.
First, the Majority failed to grasp the extent to which U.S. or-
dered discovery violates the sovereignty of foreign nations. Blackmun
79. - U.S. -.. 107 S. Ct. 2542, 2565.
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noted the change of the Government's position concerning this for-
eign sovereignty, as revealed in various amicus briefs filed on its be-
half. Convention procedures were agreed to by the signatory States
and permit discovery under those procedures without a violation of
sovereignty.
Second, two of the United States' interests are effectuating dis-
covery for parties subject to the jurisdiction of its courts and fair and
equal treatment to all parties. Blackmun states the Majority erred
when considering the first interest, offering no support for its asser-
tion that Convention procedures are too time consuming, expensive,
and futile. He counters that the opposite appears to be true, by rea-
soning that discovery under the Federal Rules can be slow and ex-
pensive, and, in any event, that "saving time and money is not such a
high priority in discovery that some additional burden cannot be tol-
erated in the interests of international goodwill."80 He also indicates
how the problematic Article 23 argument really results from misun-
derstanding. To some extent, this has been rectified by the nations
invoking it. Additionally, Blackmun noted how the problem with the
French blocking statute dissipates with resort to the Convention,
since the law includes an exception for discovery under international
agreements.
The Majority erred in addressing the second interest, fair and
equal treatment to parties. The perceived discovery and economic
advantages to the foreign party can be controlled by the court super-
vising the discovery to ensure equality amongst the parties. As for
the concern that a party suing a non-Convention national will have
an advantage over one suing a Convention national, Blackmun stated
that the Convention was intended to promote the opposite result.
Third, use of the Convention is important to all nations in pro-
moting international cooperation. Blackmun notes that resort to the
Convention will not only aid discovery, encourages communication.
This effect on international relations which transcends the legal sys-
tem and mere discovery requests.
In summary, Justice Blackmun advocated a first resort ap-
proach under the Convention. If this attempt is unsuccessful, an in-
dividual comity analysis may then be warranted.
VIII. A Criticism of Aerospatiale Opinion
In reaching its conclusion that the Hague Evidence Convention
is not exclusive and does not mandate a first resort approach, the
Aerospatiale Court did not reason well. The Court relied heavily,
80. Vienna Convention On the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, Art. 31, 63 AMER. J.
INT'L L. 875 (1969).
Fall 19881
90 DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 7:1
although not exclusively, on the language of the Convention itself.
While the text of a treaty is an indicator of the intended meaning of
the treaty, 1 it is not the sole method of interpreting the meaning of
a treaty.82 The Court correctly mentions that the Convention does
not explicitly state that it is exclusive; however, neither does it state
that it is not. Since the language does not specify what was intended,
other methods of treaty interpretation must be applied. 83 Although,
in addition to reliance on the text of the Convention, the Aerospa-
tiale Court mentions, in passing in footnotes, the position of the U.S.
Government and the negotiating history.84 As reported by Amram,
the Court failed to do a thorough treaty interpretation analysis,
which would have supported a conclusion that the Convention is
exclusive.
The Court further relied on the inclusion of permissive lan-
guage, in Article 1, 15, 16, and 17, and on Articles 23 and 27 as
81. Id.
82. Factors to consider when interpreting the meaning of a treaty include:
(a) the ordinary meaning of the words of the agreement in the context in
which they are used;
(b) the title given the agreement and statements of purpose and scope in-
cluded in its text;
(c) the circumstances attending the negotiation of the agreement;
(d) drafts and other documents submitted for consideration, action taken on
them, and the official record of the deliberations during the course of the
negotiation;
(e) unilateral statements of understanding made by a signatory before the
agreement came into effect, to the extent that they were communicated to, or
otherwise known to, the other signatory or signatories;
(f) the subsequent practice of the parties in the performance of the agree-
ment, or the subsequent practice of one party, if the other party or parties knew
or had reason to know of it;
(g) change of circumstances, to the extent indicated in § 153;
(h) the compatibility of alternative interpretations of the agreement with (i)
the obligations of the parties to other states under general international law and
other international agreements of the parties, and (ii) the principles of law com-
mon to the legal systems of the parties or of all states having reasonably devel-
oped legal systems;
(i) comparison of the texts in the different languages in which the agree-
ment was concluded, taking into account any provision in the agreement as to
the authoritativeness of the different texts.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1965) § 147.
None of these factors is to be given priority over the others, although the ordinary mean-
ing of the words must always be considered.
The latest Restatement, however, does not set forth these specific factors, but includes
reference to them in the Comment to § 325. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1987). For a comprehensive discussion leading to the conclusion
that the application of proper interpretation principles confirms the mandatory nature of the
Convention, see R. Doak Bishop, Service of Process and Discovery in International Tort Liti-
gation, 23, 1 TORT & INSURANCE L.J. 70 (Fall 1987).
83. For a comprehensive look at the impact upon case results which can be ascribed to
intervention in litigation by government bodies through amicus briefs and otherwise, see The
Role of the United States Government in International Tort Cases, D. Westin, 23 TORT &
INSURANCE L.J. 537 (Spring 1988).
84. See supra note 18.
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support for its conclusion that the Convention is not exclusive.85 As
was argued above, however, the permissive language only reflects the
alternative methods provided by the Convention, while Articles 23
and 27 have been grossly misunderstood.
The Court's fear that the "three unacceptable asymmetries"
would result from a holding of exclusivity, as well as its argument
that Convention procedures are more time consuming and expensive
and less certain to produce needed results, was amply refuted by Jus-
tice Blackmun. Further, there has been evidence from its use that
the Convention States are more likely to cooperate, quickly and to
more expansive requests, with resort to the established Convention
procedures.8 6
The Court's reasoning reflects a certain degree of "judicial
chauvinism," similar to the "pro-forum bias" mentioned by Justice
Blackmun.8s In one instance, the Court declared:
An interpretation of the Hague Convention as the exclusive
means for obtaining evidence located abroad would effectively
subject every American court hearing a case involving a national
of a contracting State to the internal law of that State. Interrog-
atories and document requests are staples of international com-
mercial litigation, no less than of other suits, yet a rule of exclu-
sivity would subordinate the court's supervision of even the most
routine of these pretrial proceedings to the actions or, equally, to
the inactions of foreign judicial authorities."
The Court's language reflects its reluctance to permit the Convention
to invade the province of American courts. Despite its concern with
the jurisdiction of the domestic courts, the protection of domestic
litigants, and the furtherance of fast and fair litigation, the Court
seems to overlook the overriding national interest in promoting and
maintaining international harmony, in international legal coopera-
tion as well as other areas, an interest which is emphasized by Jus-
tice Blackmun.
85. - U.S. - -, 107 S. Ct. 2542, 2553.
86. Supra note 10, at 1426.
87. Hudson v. Hermann Pfauter GmbH & Co., 117 F.R.D. 33 (N.D.N.Y. 1987).
88. Id. at 38-39. The court made two additional interesting points. First, this court was
of the opinion that the party opposing resort to the Convention carries the burden of proving
that use of these procedures would contravene U.S. interests. Second, in response to the argu-
ment that resort to the Convention is less efficient and costs more, the court noted that this
may change as the Convention procedures become more familiar to U.S. litigants. Id. (This
latter point is supported by a practitioner, Robert F. Brodegaard. See supra note 77.) The
court further noted that:
Indeed, discovery under the Federal Rules is so liberal that the costs of
litigation may be increased rather than reduced by the use of the Federal Rules,
since litigants in this country are commonly flooded with irrelevant documents
and information obtained through broad discovery requests and often must ex-
pend substantial resources to have attorneys and experts wade through them.
Id. at 38, n.4.
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Thus, the Supreme Court was incorrect in its reasoning in Aer-
ospatiale. This reasoning leads to the erroneous conclusion that the
Convention does not provide the exclusive and mandatory procedures
for obtaining evidence abroad.
IX. In Conclusion and In the Future
The Hague Evidence Convention was enacted to bridge the pro-
cedural gap between the broad discovery methods employed in evi-
dence gathering in the common law systems, particularly those of
the U.S., and the more restrictive methods used in the civil law sys-
tems. Specifically, it was created to solve the existing apples/oranges
problem within transnational litigation. The Convention is a com-
plete agreement, replete with a choice of procedures to use in ob-
taining foreign evidence and with optional provisions. The 1978
meeting of the Special Commission "revealed that the Convention
dealt with real needs and that it constituted a useful and efficient
bridge between the civil law systems and those of common law." 89
Despite the completeness of the Convention - or perhaps be-
cause of it - the treaty has been the subject of numerous divergent
interpretations by U.S. courts, resulting in at least the six different
approaches which were discussed. Although the Supreme Court at-
tempted to resolve the apples and oranges dispute in the Aerospa-
tiale decision, the analysis of the Court's Opinion reveals that the
problem remains unsolved.
In adopting the fifth option, that Federal Rules apply but com-
ity principles must be applied to determine if resort to the Conven-
tion is first required, the Court failed to consider many factors nor-
mally used in treaty interpretation, factors which support the
conclusion that the Convention is the exclusive means of obtaining
evidence abroad. Further, the Court misconstrued the import of the
permissive language used in the text of the Convention and over-
looked the intention of the Article 23 and Article 27 provisions.
Also, the Court's Opinion is laced with undertones of "judicial chau-
vinism." Justice Blackmun, in dissent, seems to have come closest to
the true purpose and intent of the Convention in espousing the sec-
ond option which requires first resort to Convention procedures.
In concluding that the Convention is not exclusive, that a first
resort approach is not required, and that a case-by-case analysis
must be employed by trial judges, with a dearth of guidance supplied
by the Court, the Court fails to provide a bright line of which law-
yers and courts are so fond. The trial court is required to apply a
89. Sandsend Financial Consultants, Ltd. v. Wood, 743 S.W.2d 364, 366 (Tex. Ct. App.
1988). To the same effect is In re Sealed Case, 832 F.2d 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
[Vol. 7:1
AEROSPATIALE
balancing test to determine if resort to the Convention is necessary.
If the lower courts follow the "judicial chauvanism" which seems to
be poorly disguised between the lines of the Majority Opinion, it will
be a rare U.S. lower court that can be so objective, in the face of a
cession of its jurisdictional powers, as to be able to determine that
sovereign interests of a foreign state outweigh its own.
If one can accept one district court's decision as paradigm of
U.S. courts' post-Aerospatiale reaction, perhaps all is not lost for
proponents of the Convention. In Hudson v. Hermann Pfauter
GmbH & Co.,90 a district court in New York, applying the analysis
set forth by Justice Blackmun, granted the West Germany manufac-
turer's motion for a protective order requesting that resort to Con-
vention procedures be required. In deciding to require first resort to
the Convention, the court stated that "[t]o assume that the 'Ameri-
can' rules are superior to those procedures agreed upon by the signa-
tories of the Hague Convention without first seeing those effective
Convention procedures will be in practice would reflect the same pa-
rochial biases that the Convention was designed to overcome."'
This court, with sagacious reasoning, resolved the apples and
oranges difficulty which the Supreme Court failed to do. It is unfor-
tunate, indeed, that the Supreme Court failed to clear the confusion.
Regrettably, confusion remains. Several courts have grasped the ref-
erence by the Supreme Court to the Convention as a "permissive
supplement." Without reference to the application of comity princi-
ples as a balancing factor, one court has held, "as a permissive sup-
plement, it is within the trial court's discretion to determine whether
the Hague Convention procedures should be used as a first resort." 9
It is apparent, therefore, that the Aerospatiale decision decided
very little. The line drawn by the Court was not truly a line; the rule
established by the holding is truly a non-rule. What hope is there for
the Hague Evidence Convention or for the future of transnational
litigation? The recent addition of Justice Kennedy to the Court
could affect the next Aerospatiale-type decision. Or, perhaps it is
now up to the Congress to declare to the courts that the Hague Evi-
dence Convention is mandatory, exclusive in nature, and the su-
preme law of the land. A first resort requirement, at the least, would
produce a healthy hybrid stemming from the apple/orange problem
rooted in jurisprudential systems.
90. 117 F.R.D. 33 (N.D.N.Y. 1987).
91. Id. at 38-39.
92. Id.
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